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INTRODUCTION 
Immigration has become a hot topic of national discourse in recent 
years. There have been calls on both sides of the aisle for immigration 
reform policies. As such, this highly publicized political discussion has 
evoked emotions, opinions, and actions from politicians and constituents 
alike. 
President Donald Trump has made his intention to deport “millions 
and millions” of undocumented individuals vehemently clear.1 He has 
outwardly voiced his opinion and intention to “stop . . . the killing 
machine that is illegal immigration.”2 Additionally, he has made threats to 
build a wall along the United States–Mexico border and has characterized 
his approach as a “war on illegal immigration.”3 The administration has 
already taken anti-immigrant action by attempting to end the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, stripping legal status 
from over 800,000 DREAMers who participated in the program.4 In 
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January 2017, President Trump hastily gripped the nation in confusion, 
fear, and upset when he issued Executive Order 13769, commonly known 
as the Muslim Ban, which suspended individuals from several majority-
Muslim countries from entering the United States.5 
In response, organizations and advocates have risen up in opposition 
to prevent mass deportation tactics and to protect the communities most 
affected by these strong stances and tangible actions.6 Cities, states, 
counties, and institutions have also taken proactive action in the matter by 
enacting laws, commonly referred to as “sanctuary laws.” These laws limit 
local government cooperation with federal immigration officials in 
immigration enforcement.7 
Sanctuary laws themselves have emerged as a central topic of 
national discourse. During the 2016 presidential election, these laws came 
to the forefront of the heated, controversial debate on immigration.8 
President Trump has repeatedly made sanctuary laws the subject of his 
political platform and his infamous tweets. During his campaign, then-
candidate Trump constantly made statements expressing his opposition to 
sanctuary jurisdictions specifically. In a campaign speech, he vowed that 
if he was elected he would “block funding for sanctuary cities” and “end 
the sanctuary cities.”9 During a radio interview, he again stated “sanctuary 
cities are out . . . over” and that the “federal government is going to have 
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to get involved . . . very sharply.”10 He has also tweeted that sanctuary 
areas were “crime infested & [a] breeding concept.”11 
In the past, the federal government decided to overlook these 
sanctuary laws and allow them to exist; however, as immigration evolved 
into a leading issue in American politics, the Trump administration has 
been more aggressive in immigration enforcement.12 Despite President 
Trump’s attempts to take action, since sanctuary provisions are strictly 
products of local and state governments, the federal government’s 
oversight and control over them is significantly restricted by constitutional 
principles, including the Spending Clause and the anti-commandeering 
doctrine.13 Notwithstanding, the Trump administration has continued to 
attack the validity of these state and local sanctuary laws through executive 
action. 
Within the first month of his presidency, President Trump issued 
Executive Order No. 13768.14 The order threatened to withhold substantial 
amounts of federal funding from “sanctuary jurisdictions.”15 The order 
provides, in relevant part: 
In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the Secretary, 
in their discretion and to the extent consistent with law, shall ensure 
that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 
(sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal grants, 
except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the 
Attorney General or the Secretary.16 
The Attorney General was given authority to enforce and remove federal 
funding eligibility from sanctuary jurisdictions.17 Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions subsequently spoke in a press conference, stating that the 
“Department of Justice will require jurisdictions seeking or applying for 
Department grants to certify compliance with § 1373 as a condition for 
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these awards.”18 The federal government has also continued to keep a 
record of the jurisdictions it considers to be sanctuaries.19 
In response to this direct attack on their policies, several 
jurisdictions, including Seattle and San Francisco, have brought lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of the Executive Order under the 
Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment.20 They claim that if enforced, the 
Executive Order would subject them to a devastating loss of overall 
funding, crippling budget decisions, and an egregious penalty.21 They also 
allege that the Executive Order constitutes a violation of the Tenth 
Amendment separation of powers and anti-commandeering doctrine.22 
Amongst the heated political controversy and litigation, it is difficult 
to ascertain whether these debates are momentous legal developments or 
mere political grandstanding. On one hand, from their inception, sanctuary 
laws have been symbolic political tools used by localities to protect 
vulnerable individuals when the federal government has turned a blind 
eye. On the other hand, as the lawsuits reveal, sanctuary laws raise 
constitutional issues surrounding the tensions and assertions of power 
between federal and state governments. 
In this Comment, I explore the current constitutional discourse of 
sanctuary laws and compare their various components. Part I provides 
background on the basic policy components of sanctuary laws and modern 
policies. Part II explores and compares the substantive legal and political 
value of sanctuary laws. Within this section I will first assess the impact 
of sanctuary policies on existing immigration and constitutional law. In 
doing so, I will compare specific sanctuary jurisdictions involved in 
litigation, Seattle, San Francisco, and Chicago, and their likelihood of 
withstanding preemption under existing doctrine. Then, I will discuss the 
impact sanctuary laws may have on the Tenth Amendment. Second, I will 
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assess the political impacts of sanctuary laws. I explore whether they serve 
as simple assertions of preexisting state powers or impactful legal 
doctrines. This dichotomy of interpretation will reveal that sanctuary laws 
are unlikely to yield any substantive change to current legal doctrine and, 
instead, are more valuable as political symbols of local resistance. It is my 
hope that this Comment provides a beacon of clarity amongst a foggy, 
crowded coast of controversy, opinions, and debate to guide policymakers, 
future sanctuary jurisdictions, and the public towards understanding the 
role of these laws in our society. 
I. SANCTUARY POLICIES: THEN AND NOW 
A. The Origins 
Although sanctuary laws have entered the forefront of national 
discourse, they are no new phenomenon. The term “sanctuary” became 
associated with immigration during the Central American Sanctuary 
Movement back in the 1980s.23 Civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, 
fueled by government violence, human rights abuses, and social unrest, 
forced over 468,000 people to flee and seek refuge in other countries, 
including the United States.24 Meanwhile, the U.S. government provided 
financial and combat training support to the Salvadoran government 
regime.25 Yet, thousands of individuals seeking political asylum in the 
United States were consistently denied legal entry by the U.S. 
government.26 When the U.S. government continually rejected formal aid 
to Central American refugees, U.S. churches and organizations took 
matters into their own hands and declared themselves safe havens.27 They 
provided refugees assistance in the form of basic necessities and shelter.28 
These organizations felt that it was their moral duty to provide assistance 
in light of wrongful actions by the U.S. government.29 
Soon, states and localities agreed with the grassroots assistance 
efforts and began to establish themselves as sanctuaries by enacting laws 
that provided safeguards for these Central American refugees. Common 
policies included prohibiting inquiry into immigration status and 
                                                     
 23. Hector Perla & Susan Bibler Coutin, Legacies and Origins of the 1980s US-Central 
American Sanctuary Movement, REFUGE, No.1 2009, at 7, 9–10. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 10. 
 26. Rose Cusion Villazor, What is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 139–40 (2008). 
 27. Karla McKanders, The Subnational Response: Local Intervention in Immigration Policy and 
Enforcement, in COMPASSIONATE MIGRATION AND REGIONAL POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 33, 38 
(Steven Bender & William Arrocha eds., 2017). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Villazor, supra note 26, at 133, 140. 
190 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:185 
eliminating valid immigration status as a requirement for local 
government benefits.30 Additionally, law enforcement was prohibited 
from inquiring into immigration status to improve crime reporting. This 
component, in particular, was found to not only protect immigrant 
communities but also to improve public safety overall.31 These safeguards 
were intended to provide assistance where the federal government would 
not.32 Over time, these laws developed and evolved beyond their initial 
purpose of protecting Central American refugees to protecting the greater 
undocumented and immigrant communities.33 
B. Modern Policies 
The term “sanctuary” has evolved into an umbrella term for cities, 
states, and localities with policies that limit their involvement with federal 
immigration enforcement. Modern sanctuary laws primarily exist to 
protect the national undocumented community for over 11.3 million 
individuals.34 The political terrain in immigration has taken a drastic turn 
due to many factors including the events of 9/11 and the population 
increase of immigrants in many states.35 A rise in recent mass deportation 
tactics and anti-immigrant sentiment across the country have fueled the 
modern resurgence of sanctuary laws.36 The Trump Administration’s 
crackdown on immigration enforcement incites a sentiment of anxiety and 
fear among the millions of immigrants who are presently integrated within 
American society.37 To address this concern, jurisdictions are emphasizing 
the compassionate labeling of their localities as “welcoming” or 
“sanctuary” jurisdictions.38 
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These jurisdictions decline to assist federal immigration enforcement 
agencies in their duties of enforcing immigration law in various ways. 
Sanctuary policies are not uniform; each jurisdiction maintains a unique 
policy in resistance to the enforcement of federal immigration law. The 
primary components of sanctuary policies are the (1) refusal to comply 
with federal civil detainer requests unless required by court order, (2) 
prohibition of inquiry by state and local authorities into immigration 
status, and (3) bar on the use of local funds and resources to assist federal 
enforcement. 
Over 600 localities across the country have laws that limit 
enforcement of immigration laws by state and local authorities.39 Three of 
these jurisdictions, Seattle, San Francisco, and Chicago, are explored here 
because of their unique approaches to limiting local involvement with 
immigration enforcement. All three led the country in the revival of 
sanctuary laws and other immigrant-friendly initiatives; they are also 
involved in recent litigation defending their policies against attack from 
the federal government.40 
1. Seattle 
In 2016, then-Mayor Ed Murray issued an Executive Order 
establishing Seattle as a “Welcoming City.” The Welcoming City label 
allows Seattle to “consider all the policies and practices” needed to 
“reduce the barriers of success that immigrants and refugees often face.”41 
The order prioritizes Seattle’s commitment to “foster[ing] an environment 
that makes it possible for Seattle to be a vibrant, global city 
where . . . immigrant residents can fully participate in and be integrated 
into the social, civic, and economic fabric” of the city.42 Thus, in discord 
with the anti-immigrant sentiment incited by the federal government, 
                                                     
Initiative, Sanctuary Campus Toolkit Frequently Asked Questions, https://today.law. 
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 39. Press Release, Nat’l Immigration Law Center, New State-by-State Interactive Shows How 
Much Federal Funding Sanctuary Cities Could Lose at the Hands of President Trump’s Administration 
(Mar. 2017), https://www.nilc.org/2017/03/07/state-state-interactive-on-possible-funds-loss/ [https:// 
perma.cc/9DJA-6Z5N]; see Laws, Resolutions and Policies Instituted Across the U.S. Limiting 
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 40. See generally cases cited supra note 20. 
 41. Cuc Vu, Office of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs, Seattle is a Welcoming City, 
SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/iandraffairs/programs/welcomingcity [https://perma.cc/ 
2HWM-UUH3]. 
 42. SEATTLE, WASH., EXEC. ORDER 2016-8 (Nov. 23, 2016). 
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Seattle has chosen to reaffirm its commitment to protecting its immigrant 
community. 
The 2016 executive order contained four main sanctuary 
components. First, it reaffirmed Seattle’s existing inquiry prohibition 
stating that city employees shall not inquire into immigration status. 
Second, it stated that city residents would have access to full city services 
regardless of immigration status.43 Third, the order deferred civil detainer 
requests to King County, which operates jails in place of the City of 
Seattle.44 Finally, the order established an Inclusive and Equitable City 
Cabinet composed of representatives from different city departments to 
protect the civil liberties and rights of Seattle residents.45 The Cabinet is 
comprised particularly of those with marginalized identities like 
immigrants, refugees, low-income residents, LGBTQ residents, women, 
and people with disabilities.46 
Former Mayor Ed Murray’s Order was not the first city action in this 
matter; the order built upon an existing city sanctuary policy. In 2003, the 
city council passed Ordinance 121063, Seattle’s original sanctuary 
policy.47 Ordinance 121063 was enacted in response to anti-immigrant 
sentiment after the attack of 9/11. It prohibited city employees from 
inquiring about immigration status, except when police officers have 
reasonable suspicions that a person committed a felony-level crime or was 
previously deported.48 The original Ordinance also contained a clause 
stating that nothing in the Ordinance prohibits an employee from 
cooperating with federal immigration authorities as required by law.49 This 
savings clause is likely a direct reference to fulfill the requirement 
of § 1373 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which will be discussed 
later in this Comment. 
2. San Francisco 
San Francisco’s sanctuary law has evolved over the last few decades 
into a comprehensive set of policies protecting the immigrant community. 
In 1989, San Francisco passed the “City and County of Refuge” ordinance 
                                                     
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. King County policy honors civil detainer requests from Immigration and Customs 
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establishing itself as a sanctuary jurisdiction.50 It was created as a response 
to the federal government’s reluctance to aid Central American refugees 
during the Central American Sanctuary Movement.51 Similar to Seattle’s, 
the Ordinance serves to establish public trust and ensure that all San 
Francisco residents, regardless of immigration status, have access to city 
services and benefits.52 
The City of Refuge Ordinance provides three ways in which the city 
limits its participation in immigration enforcement. First, it prohibits city 
employees from using city funds or resources to assist Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS)––now Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE)––in the enforcement of immigration law. Second, it 
prohibits city employees from “gather[ing] or disseminat[ing]” personal 
information like the release status of individuals unless required by 
another statute, regulation, or court decision. Third, it restricts law 
enforcement officers from interacting with federal immigration officials. 
It provides a non-exhaustive list of prohibited actions including (1) 
assisting or cooperating in an official capacity with any federal 
immigration investigation or detention; (2) requesting or disseminating 
information regarding the release status of any individual or any other 
personal information; (3) conditioning the receipt of city services or 
benefits on immigration status; and (4) inquiring into immigration status 
on any city application, questionnaire, or interview forms.53 
The relevant part of the statute states: 
(a) Assisting or cooperating, in one’s official capacity, with any 
investigation, detention, or arrest procedures . . . conducted by the 
Federal agency . . . except as permitted under Administrative Code 
Section 12I.3 . . . . 
. . . . 
(c) Requesting information about, or disseminating information, in 
one’s official capacity, regarding the release status of any individual 
or any other such personal information . . . or conditioning the 
provision of services or benefits by the City and County of San 
Francisco upon immigration status, except as required by Federal or 
                                                     
 50. S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE No. 375-89 (Oct. 24, 1989) (codified at S.F., CAL., ADMIN. 
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 52. Sanctuary City Ordinance, supra note 50. 
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State statute or regulation, City and County public assistance criteria, 
or court decision. 
(d) Including on any application, questionnaire, or interview form 
used in relation to benefits, services, or opportunities provided by the 
City and County of San Francisco any question regarding 
immigration status other than those required by Federal or State 
statute, regulation, or court decision.54 
Subsequently, in 2013, the “Due Process for All” Ordinance was 
passed. This Ordinance added a provision to the existing restrictions that 
prohibits civil detainer cooperation. It generally prohibits the practices of 
giving ICE advance notice of a person’s release from jail and of honoring 
ICE civil detainer requests. The relevant portion of the Ordinance 
provides: “A law enforcement official shall not detain an individual on the 
basis of a civil immigration detainer after that individual becomes eligible 
for release from custody.”55 
However, requests may be honored under certain circumstances. San 
Francisco officials may detain an individual for federal authorities up to 
forty-eight hours if the individual was convicted of a violent felony in the 
past seven years and there is probable cause that the individual is guilty of 
a violent felony.56 Additionally, city officials can give ICE advanced 
notice of an individual’s release from custody if the individual has been 
convicted of a violent or serious felony, a series of three felonies, or by a 
ruling of probable cause that the individual is guilty of a felony. 
Nonetheless, even if these circumstances are established, before 
complying with ICE, the city officers must also consider these mitigating 
factors: evidence of the individual’s rehabilitation, ties to the community, 
contribution to the community, and participation in rehabilitation or social 
service programs.57 
Finally, the Ordinance provides a catch-all clause: “Law enforcement 
officials shall not arrest or detain an individual, or provide any individual’s 
personal information to a federal immigration officer, on the basis of an 
administrative warrant, prior deportation order, or other civil immigration 
document based solely on alleged violations of the civil provisions of 
immigration laws.”58 
                                                     
 54. Id. 
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 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. § 12I.3(e). 
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3. Chicago 
Chicago also leads the nation with its immigrant-friendly initiatives. 
The sanctuary policies in Chicago began back in the 1980s during the 
Central American Sanctuary Movement.59 In 1985, then-Mayor Harold 
Washington signed an Executive Order creating Chicago’s first sanctuary 
law.60 The Order prohibited city employees from inquiring into 
immigration status and mandated that city services be provided to all 
residents regardless of immigration status.61 However, the policy was not 
codified until 2006.62 The codified law specifically prohibits state officials 
or agencies from requesting information about or investigating the 
immigration status of any individual unless required by state statute, 
federal statute, or court order.63 Additionally, it prohibits city officials 
from disclosing information regarding the immigration status of any 
individual unless required by the legal process or the individual consents 
to disclosure.64 Furthermore, the city is prohibited from conditioning any 
city benefits, opportunities, or services on immigration status.65 
Mayor Rahm Emanuel, since he assumed office in 2011, has led the 
city in pioneering a new series of immigrant-friendly policies. In 2012, he 
introduced the “Welcoming City” provision to build off the existing 
sanctuary policies and to specifically address federal civil detainers.66 The 
provision prohibits city officials from arresting or detaining a person 
solely upon (1) a belief that the individual is illegally present in the United 
States, (2) an administrative warrant for a violation of civil immigration 
law, or (3) an immigration detainer.67 
The provision also goes a step further to restrict cooperation of city 
officials with general ICE investigations. The provision states: 
Unless an agency or agent is acting pursuant to a legitimate law 
enforcement purpose that is unrelated to the enforcement of a civil 
immigration law, no agency or agent shall: A. permit ICE agents 
access to a person being detained by, or in the custody of, the agency 
or agent; B. permit ICE agents use of agency facilities for 
                                                     
 59. Kori Rumore, Chicago’s History as a Sanctuary City, CHI. TRIBUNE (Oct. 13, 2017), http:// 
www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-sanctuary-history-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/ 
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 60. CHI., ILL., EXEC. ORDER No. 85-1 (May 7, 1985); The Chicago New Americans Plan, CITY 
OF CHI. 33 (Nov. 2012), https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Office%20of% 
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 61. CHI., ILL., EXEC. ORDER No. 85-1 (May 7, 1985). 
 62. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-005 (2018). 
 63. Id. § 2-173-020. 
 64. Id. § 2-173-030. 
 65. Id. § 2-173-040. 
 66. Id. § 2-173-042. 
 67. Id. 
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investigative interviews or other investigative purpose; or C. while 
on duty, expend their time responding to ICE inquiries or 
communicating with ICE regarding a person’s custody status or 
release date.68 
Thus, Chicago officials are prohibited from allowing ICE agents to 
gain access to an individual in city custody, responding to ICE inquiries 
regarding release and custody status while on duty, and allowing ICE to 
use city facilities for federal immigration investigations.69 However, the 
provision also includes a clause stating that city officials may 
communicate with ICE to determine if a matter involves enforcement 
based solely on a violation of civil immigration law.70 It further includes 
an exception that the above restrictions on communications with ICE will 
not apply if the individual has a criminal warrant, is convicted of a felony, 
has a felony charge pending, or is a known gang member.71 
Mayor Emanuel also created the Chicago Office of New Americans 
(ONA), which is dedicated to immigrant integration and support.72 He 
subsequently released the Chicago New Americans Plan, recommending 
a comprehensive set of initiatives and programs to be implemented in 
Chicago to support immigrant communities and to improve the city’s 
overall economic and cultural growth.73 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SANCTUARY LAWS 
The President’s legal challenges to state and local sanctuary laws 
have drawn increased public attention. In the lawsuits, the Government 
frames sanctuary provisions as infringements on the Executive’s 
immigration power and the authority of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA). In opposition, the sanctuary jurisdictions assert that their laws 
do not violate federal immigration law and are mere assertions of state 
police powers. In such a highly charged and politicized debate, it is 
difficult to discern which interpretation is most accurate. 
In this section, I present an analysis of sanctuary laws under these 
two frameworks. First, I explore the legal impacts of sanctuary laws on 
existing immigration and constitutional law. To assess the impact on 
                                                     
 68. Id. 
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 71. Id.; see City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2017), 
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existing immigration law, I will analyze which sanctuary jurisdiction 
policy—Seattle, San Francisco, or Chicago—is most likely to survive a 
challenge under the INA. I will then delve into the federalism issue and 
determine whether sanctuary laws have any potential to change the Tenth 
Amendment doctrine. Finally, I will address the political impacts of 
sanctuary laws by embracing the theory that sanctuary laws are not 
revolutionary creatures of law; they merely assert existing state police 
powers. Ultimately, the analysis will reveal that sanctuary laws are most 
powerful as political expressions of a local government’s morals and 
values. 
A. The Legal Impacts of Sanctuary Laws 
1. Immigration Law 
Sanctuary laws have, from their inception, allowed local 
governments to establish protections for immigrants when state laws are 
in disagreement with federal policies.74 In the present day, the widespread 
presence of sanctuary laws across the country represents a unique shift in 
federalism that challenges the federal government’s exclusive control over 
the area of immigration. The following discussion of immigration law and 
federal preemption regarding the Seattle, San Francisco, and Chicago 
policies will reveal that sanctuary laws can legally coexist with and pose 
no threat to federal immigration law. 
It is a long-standing principle that the federal government has plenary 
power to legislate in the area of immigration. This plenary power was first 
established by Chae Chan Ping v. United States, where the Court validated 
the Chinese Exclusion Act.75 Policy concerns about the maintenance of a 
uniform national immigration policy support the upholding of the plenary 
power doctrine. Nonetheless, the plenary power of the Executive over the 
area of immigration was created by cases motivated by racial animus and 
xenophobic attitudes. Particularly, the seemingly pretextual use of national 
security and foreign affairs justifications used in previous cases seems to 
                                                     
 74. See supra Part I.B. (discussing sanctuary laws originating from localities seeking to provide 
assistance to Central American refugees upon the U.S. government’s policy to deny the refugees 
political asylum due to involvement in the Salvadoran regime). 
 75. 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012) 
(holding that immigration regulations surely fall within Congress’s plenary power); Takahashi v. Fish 
& Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (“The Federal Government has broad constitutional 
powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, 
regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their 
naturalization.”). 
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require further judicial scrutiny.76 Thus, even the circumstances under 
which the plenary power doctrine was established may not be as infallible 
as ordinarily thought. Even the Executive’s plenary power over 
immigration is subject to judicial scrutiny for constitutional limitations.77 
The Supreme Court, in the past, has been inconsistent in its application of 
Congress’s plenary power over immigration in several cases where it 
deemed federal immigration actions invalid on procedural fairness 
grounds.78 Thus, despite claims of Executive plenary power, there is room 
for state and local regulations to have some impact on immigration law. 
This plenary immigration power grants the federal government 
authority to enforce immigration law exclusively.79 The Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965 (INA)—also known as the Hart-Cellar Act—is a 
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for immigration and 
naturalization.80 The INA repealed the original national-origin quota 
immigration policies.81 It has since become the primary means through 
which the federal government exercises its immigration authority.82 
The INA provision that is most threatening to local sanctuary laws 
is, § 1373.83 Section 1373, titled “Communication between government 
agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” prohibits state 
and local governments from enacting laws that limit certain types of 
communication with the federal government about immigration and 
citizenship status information.84 Section 1373 states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, 
a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not 
prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from 
sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization 
                                                     
 76. Brief of Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, Holly Yasui, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for 
Law and Equality, Civil Rights Organizations and National Bar Associations of Color as Amici Curiae 
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 78. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374–75 (2010) (limiting the federal 
government’s plenary power to deport by adding procedural requirements per the Sixth Amendment); 
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 79. De Canas v. Bica, 42 U.S. 351, 354 (1976). 
 80. Immigration and Nationality (Hart-Cellar) Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 
(codified as 8 U.S.C. Ch. 12). 
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 82. The statute now dictates the bulk of the work performed by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement and the Department of Homeland Security. Chishti, Hipsman & Ball, supra note 81. 
 83. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373 (West 2018). 
 84. Id. 
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Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, 
lawful or unlawful, of any individual.85  
Also, government entities, in particular, may not be restricted or 
prohibited from sending, requesting, receiving, maintaining, or 
exchanging information regarding an individual’s immigration status.86 
However, § 1373 does not compel local governments to comply with 
ICE civil detainer requests. As a matter of law, civil detainer requests are 
voluntary and local governments are not required to honor them.87 
Furthermore, courts have deemed ICE civil detainer requests as 
unconstitutional violations of the Fourth Amendment for detaining an 
individual without probable cause.88 Laws restricting cooperation with 
civil detainer requests can be interpreted as merely precautionary measures 
to ensure that local governments do not violate the Fourth Amendment 
rights of individuals under their custody. 
The primary consequence for jurisdictions that violate § 1373 is 
ineligibility for the Byrne Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program which 
provides federal funding grants to states and localities for law enforcement 
purposes.89 In 2016, the Attorney General made Byrne JAG funding 
explicitly conditional upon compliance with § 1373.90 Many other federal 
grant programs are also conditioned upon the general requirement of 
“compliance with all applicable federal laws.”91 Section 1373 is currently 
being challenged in pending lawsuits brought by several sanctuary 
                                                     
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
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 90. Opposition, supra note 89; see Memorandum from Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen., to 
Karol V. Mason, Assistant Att’y Gen. of Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice Referral 
of Allegations of 8 U.S.C. §1373 by Grant Recipients (May 31, 2016). 
 91. See Opposition, supra note 89, at 7. 
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jurisdictions. President Trump’s Executive Order regarding sanctuary city 
funding, Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ subsequent actions, and the 
Government’s defenses in the pending lawsuits all rely heavily on § 1373 
as valid grounds to invalidate or pre-empt sanctuary jurisdiction policies. 
The constitutional doctrine of preemption maintains the generally 
exclusive federal power over immigration law. This doctrine also prevents 
state laws, here sanctuary laws, from impacting federal immigration law. 
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution asserts that “the laws of the 
United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.”92 Congress thus 
has the power to preempt state law through express federal legislation.93 
Additionally, state laws can be preempted through field preemption and 
conflict preemption.94 Field preemption occurs when the federal regulation 
of a field is “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the states” to 
legislate; thus, states are precluded from enacting policy in that area.95 
Conflict preemption arises when “compliance with both federal and state 
regulations becomes a physical impossibility.”96 To determine if a state 
law is preempted by federal immigration law, the court will inquire into 
whether the state law (1) attempts to regulate an existing immigration law, 
(2) attempts to regulate a field already fully occupied by Congress, or (3) 
conflicts with existing immigration law.97 
A preemption analysis of sanctuary provisions reveals that they pose 
no threat to existing federal immigration law and are well within the realm 
of state legislation. The strongest argument for federal preemption of state 
sanctuary laws is a combination of express and conflict preemption 
by § 1373 of the INA. Field preemption is not an issue because the Court 
has stated that there is room for states to legislate in immigration despite 
the plenary power of the Executive.98 As such, a closer look at the language 
of § 1373 and a comparison with the language of the sanctuary provisions 
enacted in Seattle, San Francisco, and Chicago will reveal their likelihood 
of preemption. 
Section 1373 prohibits state and local entities from preventing the 
sending of information about an individual’s immigration status and the 
                                                     
 92. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. 
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receiving of information about an individual from ICE.99 First, consider 
the operative language of the San Francisco sanctuary provision, which 
states that no agent of the city of San Francisco “shall use any City funds 
or resources to assist in the enforcement of Federal immigration law or to 
gather or disseminate information regarding release status of individuals 
or any other such personal information . . . .”100 It can be argued that San 
Francisco’s broad restriction on the gathering of information conflicts with 
the § 1373 language of “receiving information” about an individual from 
ICE. If this section was considered alone, the provision would seem to be 
preempted by conflict with § 1373.101 However, upon consideration of the 
greater construction and application of the San Francisco policy, the odds 
seem brighter for the city. 
Taken as a whole, the San Francisco provision is more accurately 
described as a “don’t ask” policy. The policy prohibition on “gathering” 
information compared to the § 1373 language of “receiving” are 
reconcilable because “gathering” is proactive while “receiving” is 
passive.102 Thus, the San Francisco law only restricts local officials from 
proactively acquiring information or inquiring about immigration status, 
but there is no express prohibition on the passive receipt of information 
from ICE, which would conflict with § 1373. Cumulatively, since the 
policy bars any inquiry into immigration status, in practice the city would 
not have any information to “send” to federal immigration enforcement. 
Even if ICE requested information validly per § 1373, if the prohibition 
on inquiry was properly followed, the city would have no information to 
share. Thus, the San Francisco restriction on the “dissemination” of 
information avoids conflict with the “sending” language of § 1373 
generally. The only information the city possesses that may be of concern 
is the release date of individuals from city custody, which falls under the 
civil detainer and release notice provision of § 12I.3. However, this 
provision provides guidelines for when city officials can respond to federal 
requests for notices of release.103 Additionally, there is an anti-
commandeering concern with this provision, which will be further 
discussed below.104 Implicitly, the ordinance thus does not prohibit the 
passive receipt of information. It just restricts when state officials can 
respond to those requests, an action that is not mandated by § 1373.105 
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Thus, it seems that the San Francisco provision could likely withstand a 
preemption challenge. 
In comparison to San Francisco, the Seattle preemption analysis is 
simpler, and the Seattle provision is more likely to withstand challenges 
because of its clear “don’t ask” approach. Since Seattle does not operate 
any jails or prisons, the sanctuary ordinance does not contain a provision 
defining the city officials’ involvement with civil detainers or notice of 
release requests by ICE.106 As a result, the only possible conflicting 
provision with § 1373 states “unless otherwise required by law or by court 
order, no Seattle city officer shall inquire into the immigration status of 
any person, or engage in activities designed to ascertain the immigration 
status of any person.”107 This provision explicitly prohibits the proactive 
inquiry by city officials into immigration status, but it is silent on sending 
or receiving of immigration status information with ICE. It simply 
embraces a “don’t ask” type of approach.108 Thus, it does not seem to be 
within the same realm of § 1373’s regulation: the sending or receiving of 
information. 
Similar to the first provision of the San Francisco policy, in 
application the city would have no relevant information to send to ICE. In 
addition, the Seattle code includes a savings clause that “[n]othing in this 
chapter shall be construed to prohibit any Seattle City officer or employee 
from cooperating with federal immigration authorities as required by 
law.”109 If there was any slim doubt as to the validity of the Seattle 
sanctuary law, this statement clearly removes any concern about possible 
preemption or any outright restriction of interaction with federal 
authorities. 
Unlike the Seattle and San Francisco sanctuary laws,110 the Chicago 
law embodies a “don’t ask and don’t tell” policy. It explicitly restricts 
cooperation of city authorities with ICE and prohibits not only inquiry into 
immigration status but also disclosure of such information.111 Unlike the 
other sanctuary laws discussed, the Chicago law contains a prohibition on 
disclosure of immigration status information: “No agent or agency shall 
disclose information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any 
person.”112 Thus, a stronger argument could be made in this case that at 
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least part of the Chicago sanctuary law is preempted by § 1373. The 
prohibition on “communicating with ICE regarding a person’s custody 
status or release date”113 could be interpreted as restricting the “receiving” 
and “sending” of information about an individual between city officials 
and ICE.114 Although in application, this policy would function like Seattle 
and San Francisco, where the inquiry restriction would essentially prevent 
any dissemination. The inclusion of this explicit restriction on 
“communicating” with ICE arguably conflicts with § 1373. The decision 
to include “communicating” after already using the term “responding” 
may indicate a broader reading of the term that prohibits not only 
responding to ICE requests but also information sharing.115 Additionally, 
the clause prohibiting disclosure, except under certain circumstances, 
seems to restrict the sending of information to ICE as well.116 Further, the 
disclosure provision arguably could be preempted, but the exception “as 
required by law” (including § 1373), may be enough to carve out an 
exception for § 1373 and avoid preemption.117 
Ultimately, Chicago’s more comprehensive “don’t ask and don’t 
tell” approach, restricting inquiry and disclosure of information, treads 
closer to preemption than the other two laws discussed above. The safest 
approach is exhibited by Seattle in its focus strictly on a “don’t ask” policy 
without the inclusion of a civil detainer or notification request provision. 
San Francisco’s law also has a good likelihood of withstanding preemption 
even with inclusion of its civil detainer and notification request provision. 
Notably, this analysis reveals that state and local sanctuary laws can 
coexist with federal immigration law. Their existence does not conflict 
with or pose any potential change to current immigration doctrine. 
2. Constitutional Law: Tenth Amendment 
Although the federal government has plenary power over 
immigration, tension exists over what powers can be asserted over 
sanctuary laws as creatures of state law. The Tenth Amendment provides 
that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”118 As part of the Tenth Amendment, the anti-
commandeering doctrine states that Congress may not enact regulations 
that directly compel states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory 
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program.119 States must retain their ability to make independent state 
policy.120 This allows states to remain accountable to their residents for 
policy decisions and prevents state governments from being blamed for 
federal policy decisions.121 The anti-commandeering doctrine prevents the 
federal government from compelling state governments to take affirmative 
actions to enforce or administer a federal program. But it has not, in the 
most recent applications, prohibited the federal government from issuing 
proscriptive restrictions on state governments. 
Existing sanctuary laws may have the potential to expand the anti-
commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment to include a 
proscriptive element. A valid argument exists that § 1373 violates the anti-
commandeering doctrine because in prohibiting localities from placing 
participation restrictions, it essentially compels enforcement or 
administration of a federal regulatory program.122 Although two courts 
have upheld § 1373 as a constitutional exercise of congressional power, 
there is some room for a bona fide challenge to the constitutionality 
of § 1373 to be successful.123 
There is an opportunity for the Court, however, to expand the anti-
commandeering doctrine to allow states to prohibit voluntary compliance 
in regards to proscriptive federal statutes.124 This move falls in line with 
the policy of the anti-commandeering doctrine. In application, local 
governments cannot comply with § 1373 and hold their employees 
accountable for the policy decision not to participate in the federal 
program.125 Thus, it seems that the local government is commandeered 
by § 1373 because it “effectively thwarts” the ability of local government 
to extricate their jurisdiction from involvement in the federal program.126 
Additionally, as mentioned in City of New York, if a locality’s 
sanctuary law generally discussed the greater confidentiality and privacy 
concerns of information, then a stronger argument could be made 
that § 1373 commandeers the locality against its own interest.127 However, 
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in the absence of precedent, any change to the doctrine must be made by 
the Supreme Court.128 In light of the challenges to President Trump’s 
executive order, there is a possibility, although slim, that this change could 
occur soon. 
City of New York v. United States is the only case where the court 
upheld the constitutionality of § 1373 under the Tenth Amendment anti-
commandeering clause.129 The case arose when the New York mayor 
enacted Executive Order No. 124, a sanctuary policy. The Ordinance 
prohibited city employees and officials from voluntarily providing federal 
authorities with information concerning the immigration status of any 
individual.130 There were exceptions in the provision allowing 
communication with federal authorities when required by law if the 
individual authorized the sharing of information or if the individual was 
suspected of engaging in criminal behavior.131 If the information fit into 
an exception, the Ordinance named only particular officers that made the 
final decision on whether to alert federal authorities or not. Ultimately, the 
court held that § 1373 does not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine 
of the Tenth Amendment.132 Its decision rested on the premise that 
proscriptive regulations, contrary to affirmative ones, do not compel state 
and local governments to enact or administer any federal regulatory 
program.133 The court stated that § 1373 does not “affirmatively 
conscript[] states, localities, or their employees into the federal 
government’s service.”134 Additionally, it does not directly compel states 
or localities to affirmatively require or prohibit anything to comply with a 
federal regulatory scheme.135 However, the holding is narrow 
because § 1373 infringed on the New York executive order alone.136 
The court left room for a decision involving “whether these Sections 
would survive a constitutional challenge in the context of generalized 
confidentiality policies that are necessary to the performance of legitimate 
municipal functions and that include federal immigration status,” and 
declined to offer an opinion on that matter.137 Thus, a challenge to the 
proscriptive § 1373 by a city with a generalized confidentiality policy 
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could be successful. In Chicago v. Sessions, currently being litigated, the 
court has recognized that the “practical” impact of § 1373 is that “state and 
local governments are limited in their ability to decline to administer or 
enforce a federal regulatory program.”138 Thus, there is potential that the 
proscriptive nature of § 1373 compels state and local governments to 
administer a federal regulatory scheme. 
If formally recognized as such by the court, the decision would be a 
groundbreaking evolution of the anti-commandeering doctrine, which 
currently only applies to affirmative statutes. Sanctuary laws are well-
suited to lead this change because most provisions preserve the 
confidentiality of personal information, including immigration status, and 
may conflict with the compelling requirements of § 1373. 
B. The Political Impacts of Sanctuary Laws 
Sanctuary laws—originating from churches that functioned as 
“sanctuaries” for asylum seekers139—have been motivated by a sentiment 
of moral duty and ethical obligation.140 Today, sanctuary laws continue to 
hold true to their origins and serve primarily as political symbols.141 The 
laws send a message to the jurisdiction’s citizens and the rest of the 
country denouncing anti-immigrant sentiment and policies. The language 
in the purpose and preamble provisions of sanctuary laws make this 
intention starkly clear. The policies assert the importance of immigrants in 
the community and emphasize the need to maintain a diverse and inclusive 
community within the jurisdiction.142 
Additionally, the substantive content of sanctuary laws, for the most 
part, seem to merely reiterate rights already protected within the state 
police power or other constitutional limitations. The state police power, 
protected by the Tenth Amendment, gives the state sovereign power in 
determining the best approach to address crime and public safety.143 The 
courts have recognized that state and local governments have a compelling 
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interest in maintaining a strong, trustworthy relationship with 
undocumented and immigrant residents in their communities.144 
Jurisdictions assert that the purpose of their sanctuary laws is to 
improve trust between the local law enforcement authority and the 
undocumented immigrant community to encourage victims and witnesses 
to come forward in reporting crime and aid in investigations.145 In the 
aggregate, by removing this obstacle for undocumented residents, the goal 
is to reduce crime and improve public safety overall.146 A recent study 
proves that this goal is, in fact, being achieved; sanctuary jurisdictions are, 
as a whole, safer and stronger communities.147 The research showed that 
in jurisdictions without sanctuary laws, where law enforcement agencies 
frequently comply with detainer requests, it was harder for the local 
agency to investigate crimes because victims and witnesses were less 
likely to come forward due to the risk of detainment and deportation.148 
Thus, the sanctuary law provisions that restrict compliance with ICE 
detainer or notification requests and prohibit inquiry into immigration 
status seem to be a valid means to the greater end of improving public 
safety. This action regarding safety would fit within the accepted scope of 
state police powers. In doing so, the primary purpose of sanctuary laws is 
to send a message establishing trust between the local community and its 
undocumented residents rather than make a substantive change to 
immigration law. 
Sanctuary laws, to some extent, create effective legal protections for 
undocumented residents and other immigrants by protecting the collection 
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and distribution of personal identifying information.149 However, these 
protections are neither infallible nor comprehensive.  
Sanctuary policies have failed. Despite the state’s sanctuary law, in 
2017, the Washington State Department of Licensing (DOL) shared the 
personal information of hundreds of Washington residents with federal 
immigration enforcement agencies.150 Community organizations also 
warn that sanctuary laws do not provide comprehensive protection from 
immigration enforcement; ICE can still operate in churches, schools, 
workplaces, and even homes.151 Local organizations still urge families to 
remain vigilant and prepare emergency plans should they become detained 
or separated.152 Nonetheless, sanctuary laws are a step forward in 
protecting immigrant communities. 
Overall, state and local governments do not seem to be making any 
large-scale radical change in immigration law by enacting sanctuary laws. 
Instead, they are using sanctuary laws to send a message of opposition to 
harsh federal policies or a message of trust and commitment to diversity 
and inclusiveness to their residents—and the federal government. Though 
not impactful on substantive legal doctrine, sanctuary policies carry 
significant normative influence simply because they are laws. 
The traditional intent of legal regulation is to change behaviors by 
changing collective attitudes among the community.153 Mere publicity and 
knowledge of a law can curb discouraged behaviors and promote positive 
beliefs about the moral purpose of the law.154 Further research is needed 
to determine the exact efficacy of sanctuary laws on creating safe, 
inclusive spaces for immigrants. Regardless, the message sent by cities, 
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states, and counties declaring themselves as “welcoming,” “inclusive,” 
and places of “refuge” is a powerful one. 
CONCLUSION 
Sanctuary laws have come to the forefront of immigration law 
discussions in recent years due to recent concerns about terrorism and the 
changing population demographics in the country. Bucking these 
concerns, many jurisdictions have resisted xenophobia and opted to enact 
sanctuary laws that restrict the use of local resources in federal 
immigration enforcement. In an exploration of whether these sanctuary 
laws possess more legal or political influence, my analysis concluded that 
the primary purpose and influence of these laws is political in nature.155 
Although the federal government—the executive branch in 
particular—maintains plenary authority over immigration, state and local 
sanctuary laws can coexist with federal immigration law. Sanctuary 
provisions are unlikely to make any revolutionary change to existing 
immigration law because of the restrictions set forth in § 1373 of the INA 
and the doctrine of federal preemption. Sanctuary provisions must be 
narrowly tailored to fit within the space untouched by § 1373. The best 
approach would be a pure “don’t ask” policy, similar to Seattle’s. 
Meanwhile, a “don’t tell” policy, like Chicago’s, that restricts disclosure 
and communication with ICE, has a greater chance of being preempted 
by § 1373.156 Sanctuary laws do have potential to expand the Tenth 
Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine and prevent federal 
proscriptive regulatory schemes. However, this does not seem to be their 
main purpose. 
Ultimately, the power of sanctuary laws lies in their political and 
moral messaging. These policies symbolize opposition to current 
immigration enforcement tactics and promote the values of 
trustworthiness and inclusiveness among the community.157 They 
represent a collective commitment to protecting immigrant communities 
in the face of aggressive government action. By no means are these 
policies perfect; however, they create protections for the some of the most 
marginalized members of American society. It is my hope that this 
Comment brings clarity to an area of public concern so heavily diluted 
with misinformation. Sanctuary policies are at their core, as they were at 
their origins, about preserving “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” 
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for all members of society—a founding principle of the United States of 
America. 
